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Footnotes 
1. 1 131 S.Ct. 1849 (2011).
2. Id. at 1855 (quoting King v. Commonwealth, 302 S.W.3d 649, 656
(Ky. 2010)).
3. Id. at 1858.
4. Id. at 1858.
5. Id. at 1858 n.4.
6. See id. at 1858-62.
7. See id. at 1858 (noting that officers may seize evidence in plain
view or seek consent to search if they are a place where they are
lawfully entitled to be); id. at 1862 (officers may knock on a door
and ask to speak with an occupant just as a private citizen may
knock).
Perhaps to most observers, the blockbusters from theUnited States Supreme Court’s 2010-2011 Term were onthe civil side of the docket. Yet the Court did address a
number of important aspects of policing and criminal prosecu-
tions, such as the Fourth Amendment and exigent circum-
stances, Miranda and juveniles, and the Confrontation Clause.
I believe that the most significant criminal-law-related rulings
from the past Term may turn out to be the Court’s habeas cor-
pus cases. The justices issued a series of opinions that interpret
the federal habeas statutes to afford greater deference to state
courts and that make it more difficult for federal petitioners to
obtain evidentiary hearings. This article reviews the leading
criminal-law-related opinions of the Supreme Court’s 2010
Term, emphasizing those decisions that have the greatest
impact on the States, including the habeas rulings. The article
concludes with a brief preview of the current Term.
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The justices issued three significant Fourth Amendment
decisions this past Term. In Kentucky v. King,1 the most notable
of the trio, the Court ruled that a warrantless search of a home
may be supported by exigent circumstances even if those cir-
cumstances were created by police. The other opinions
addressed substantial questions about retroactivity and the
exclusionary rule, and about allegations of pretextual arrests. 
In King, officers conducted a controlled buy of crack
cocaine outside an apartment complex. The seller then moved
quickly to the breezeway of an apartment building. Before
police could get there, he entered one of two apartments off of
the breezeway. Officers smelled marijuana smoke coming from
the apartment on the left. They knocked and announced their
presence and, hearing noises inside, believed that drug-related
evidence was about to be destroyed. The officers then entered
the apartment and found drugs and other contraband. The
defendant, King, was charged with narcotics offenses. But it
was the wrong apartment. When police eventually entered the
apartment on the right, they found the suspected cocaine
seller. The Kentucky Supreme Court found that the search of
the apartment on the left was impermissible, saying that
“police cannot ‘deliberately creat[e] the exigent circumstances
with the bad faith intent to avoid the warrant requirement,’”
and that officers may not rely on exigent circumstances if it
was “reasonably foreseeable” that the tactics used by police
would create the circumstances in the first place.2 In an 8-1
decision written by Justice Alito, the Supreme Court reversed.
The majority noted that warrantless searches are allowed
“when the circumstances make it reasonable . . . to dispense
with the warrant requirement.”3 The exigent circumstances
rule justifies a warrantless search when the conduct of the offi-
cers before the exigency “is reasonable in the same sense.
Where, as here, the police did not create the exigency by
engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the
Fourth Amendment, warrantless entry to prevent the destruc-
tion of evidence is reasonable and thus allowed.”4 The Court
did not further explain what it meant by “engaging or threat-
ening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth
Amendment,” but it acknowledged the “strong argument” that
the exigent circumstances rule might not apply where the
police “without a warrant or any legally sound basis for a war-
rantless entry, threaten that they will enter without permission
unless admitted.”5
The Court also expressly rejected a number of rules formu-
lated by lower courts that have limited the reach of the exigent
circumstances doctrine. Among the rules rejected by the
majority were those that ask whether officers deliberately and
in bad faith created the exigent circumstances; whether it was
reasonably foreseeable that the investigative tactics would cre-
ate the exigent circumstances; whether officers had probable
cause and time to secure a warrant; and whether the investiga-
tion was contrary to standard or good law enforcement prac-
tices.6 The key question, said the majority, was simply whether
officers were where they were entitled to be and whether they
gained entry by means of an actual or threatened violation of
the Fourth Amendment.7 The majority then remanded for the
state court to decide whether there actually were exigent cir-
cumstances on the facts of this case, though the Court also
rejected the defendant’s characterization that officers had
threatened to enter without a warrant if the occupants did not
voluntarily open the door.
Justice Ginsburg dissented, arguing that the Court “today
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8. Id. at 1864 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
9. Id. at 1865-66.
10. 131 S.Ct. 2419 (2011).
11. 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
12. 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
13. Davis, 131 S.Ct. at 2427 (citations omitted).
14. Id. at 2428 (quoting Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144
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15. Id. at 2429.
16. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
17. Davis, 131 S.Ct. at 2436 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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19. Id. (citations omitted).
20. Professor Orin Kerr, who represented Davis, made a number of
these points in an article he wrote before his work on the Davis
case.  See Orin S. Kerr, Good Faith, New Law, and the Scope of the
Exclusionary Rule, 99 GEO. L.J. 1077 (2011).
21. 131 S.Ct. 2074 (2011).
arms the police with a way routinely to dishonor the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement in drug cases.”8 In her view,
the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant require-
ment should be more narrowly cabined, and she faulted offi-
cers for not seeking a warrant when they had probable cause
and time to obtain it.9
Davis v. United States,10 another Fourth Amendment case
with a majority opinion authored by Justice Alito, concerns
whether the exclusionary rule applies when officers rely on
prior precedent in objectively good faith. Many courts had read
New York v. Belton11 as authorizing an automobile search inci-
dent to arrest whether or not the arrestee was within reaching
distance of the car at the time of the search. Two Terms ago, the
Court decided Arizona v. Gant12 and held that an officer may
conduct an automobile search incident to an arrest only if the
arrestee was within reaching distance of the car during the
search or if officers had reason to believe that evidence relevant
to the crime of arrest was within the vehicle. The search in
Davis took place before Gant.
The Court ruled 7-2 that the exclusionary rule did not apply
to this search. The majority emphasized that the sole purpose
of the exclusionary rule was to deter future Fourth
Amendment violations and that prior decisions limited the
rule’s operation to situations in which deterrence was most
effectively served. The Court said that real deterrent value was
a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for exclusion and
that the analysis also must take into consideration the sub-
stantial social costs generated by the rule. Acknowledging that
a number of prior cases did not take such a “discriminating”
approach, the justices said that the Court has abandoned an
older “reflexive” application of the exclusionary rule and has
“imposed a more rigorous weighing of its costs and deterrence
benefits.”13 Thus, “[p]olice practices trigger the harsh sanction
of exclusion only when they are deliberate enough to yield
‘meaningfu[l]’ deterrence, and culpable enough to be ‘worth
the price paid by the justice system.’”14 In the case at bench,
binding precedent specifically authorized the search that
turned up the gun, and “[a]bout all that exclusion would deter
in this case is conscientious police work.”15
But the principal argument by Davis and the dissenting jus-
tices was that the case should turn on retroactivity principles.
Under Griffith v. Kentucky,16 new criminal procedure decisions
apply to cases that are pending on direct appeal or not yet final.
The majority turned aside this argument, distinguishing
between the retroactive application of the substantive Fourth
Amendment holding in Gant and the remedy that follows such
an application. Thus, the Court found that the search violated
the Fourth Amendment under Gant, but principles of retroac-
tivity did not require application
of the remedy of exclusion where
the purposes of the exclusionary
rule would not be effectively
advanced. The majority also
rejected the claim that this
would stunt the development of
Fourth Amendment law because
defendants would have no incen-
tive to ask a court to reconsider
Fourth Amendment precedents.
Justice Sotomayor concurred.
She pointed out that the case did
not present the question of
whether the exclusionary rule
applies where the law governing the constitutionality of the
search is unsettled. On the facts of this case, binding authority
specifically authorized the search.
Justice Breyer dissented, joined by Justice Ginsburg. While
agreeing that the substantive holding of Gant applied retroac-
tively, the dissenters argued that the majority’s distinction
between the retroactive application of the rule and the avail-
ability of the remedy is highly artificial and counter to prece-
dent.17 The dissenters sharply disagreed with the broad use of
a culpability test to determine the application of the exclu-
sionary rule. They expressed fear for the future of the exclu-
sionary rule, arguing that if an officer’s culpability is determi-
native and if the Court “would apply the exclusionary rule
only where a Fourth Amendment violation was ‘deliberate,
reckless, or grossly negligent,’ then the ‘good faith’ exception
will swallow the exclusionary rule.”18 Further, “our broad dicta
in Herring—dicta the Court repeats and expands upon today—
may already be leading lower courts in this direction.”19 And
Justices Breyer and Ginsburg were concerned that the Court’s
ruling will make it difficult for lower courts to reconsider prior
decisions.20
Another important Fourth Amendment case was Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd.21 In 2003, al-Kidd was arrested as a material witness
pursuant to a warrant. The warrant alleged that al-Kidd had
information crucial to a prosecution, and he was arrested
checking in for a flight to Saudi Arabia. Al-Kidd was held for
16 days and then placed on supervised release for more than a
year. He never was called as a witness. Al-Kidd later filed a civil
rights action against former Attorney General Ashcroft, alleg-
ing that he and other material witnesses were detained because
the government suspected them of supporting terrorism but
lacked sufficient evidence to charge them with a crime and that
there was no intention to call al-Kidd as a witness. The lower
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24. Al-Kidd, 131 S.Ct. at 2085.
25. 131 S.Ct. 1387 (2011).
26. Id.
27. 130 S.Ct. 1195 (2010).
28. 130 S.Ct. 1213 (2010).
29. 130 S.Ct. 2250 (2010).
30. 131 S.Ct. 2394 (2011).
31. It appeared from the trial court’s findings that warnings were given
only after the initial confession, but the point was not entirely
clear, and the state courts may revisit the findings on remand.  Id.
at 2400 n.2.
32. Id. at 2403.
33. 541 U.S. 652 (2004).
federal courts denied Ashcroft’s
motion to dismiss based on
absolute and qualified immu-
nity. The Supreme Court
reversed. Although the case is a
civil rights action and not a
criminal appeal, it contains an
important Fourth Amendment
holding. 
The Court held both that the
complaint failed to allege a
Fourth Amendment violation
and that Ashcroft did not violate clearly established law. The
opinion for the Court, written by Justice Scalia (and joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Thomas, and
Alito), addresses the allegation that the use of the material wit-
ness warrant was pretextual. The majority noted that the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry is predominantly
objective. Courts ask whether the circumstances, viewed
objectively, justify the government’s actions. “If so, that action
was reasonable ‘whatever the subjective intent’ motivating the
relevant officials.”22 There are limited exceptions where actual
motivations do matter—such as special-needs and administra-
tive-search cases—but neither category was relevant here. Nor
could al-Kidd rely on checkpoint or other suspicionless stop
cases because here there was a warrant issued by a judge based
on individualized suspicion. The majority also rejected al-
Kidd’s claim that Whren v. United States23 established that one
may ignore subjective intent only where there is probable cause
to believe that a violation of law has occurred. The Court con-
cluded that “an objectively reasonable arrest and detention of
a material witness pursuant to a validly obtained warrant can-
not be challenged as unconstitutional on the basis of allega-
tions that the arresting authority had an improper motive.”24
Justice Kennedy pointed out in a concurring opinion some
of the challenges faced by a national officeholder when faced
with inconsistent legal rules in different jurisdictions and
argued that a national officeholder should be given some def-
erence for qualified-immunity purposes. Justice Ginsburg
(joined by Justices Breyer and Sotomayor) agreed that there
was no clearly established law that rendered Ashcroft answer-
able in damages. But they also questioned whether there was a
validly obtained material witness warrant, pointing to some
omissions from the affidavit supporting the warrant.  
Finally, the justices heard argument in another Fourth
Amendment case, Tolentino v. New York,25 that raised the ques-
tion of whether preexisting identity-related governmental doc-
uments (such as motor vehicle records) are subject to the
exclusionary rule when they are obtained as the direct result of
police action that violates the Fourth Amendment. But the
Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently
granted.26
FIFTH AMENDMENT
The 2009-2010 Term gave us three Miranda blockbusters,
including Florida v. Powell,27 Maryland v. Shatzer,28 and espe-
cially Berghuis v. Thompkins.29 There was only one Miranda
case in the 2010-2011 Term, J.D.B. v. North Carolina,30 but it
was important. The Court held that the age of a minor sub-
jected to police questioning is relevant to the Miranda custody
analysis.
J.D.B. was a 13-year-old student in the seventh grade. North
Carolina officers suspected him of participating in several
home break-ins. A uniformed police officer pulled him from
his classroom and escorted him to a closed-door conference
room at the school. There he was questioned by two officers
with two school administrators present. Before questioning,
J.D.B. was given neither Miranda warnings nor the opportunity
to speak with his grandmother (who was his legal guardian).
J.D.B. initially denied any wrongdoing. After being confronted
with a stolen camera and told by a school administrator to “do
the right thing,” he asked if he would still be in trouble if he
returned the stolen items. The investigating officer warned that
he might need to seek an order sending J.D.B. to juvenile
detention if the officer believed he would continue to break
into other homes. J.D.B. confessed. He was subsequently given
Miranda warnings and acknowledged understanding them.31
J.D.B. then gave additional information including the location
of the stolen items. In juvenile court, J.D.B.’s suppression
motions were denied, and he was adjudicated delinquent. The
North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed.  The U.S. Supreme
Court reversed in a 5-4 decision.
Writing for the majority, Justice Sotomayor first noted the
compelling pressures inherent in a custodial interrogation.
Whether a suspect is in custody is an objective inquiry that
encompasses two discrete inquiries, including the circum-
stances surrounding the interrogation and whether, given those
circumstances, a reasonable person would feel free to terminate
the interrogation and leave. Although the inquiry is objective in
nature, the majority rejected the State’s argument that a child’s
age has no place in the custody analysis. The majority noted
that a reasonable child subjected to police questioning some-
times will feel pressured to submit even when a reasonable
adult would not, and “courts can account for that reality with-
out doing any damage to the objective nature of the custody
analysis.”32 Distinguishing Yarborough v. Alvarado,33 where the
justices held that a state court’s exclusion of age from the cus-
tody determination was not objectively unreasonable under the
54 Court Review - Volume 47 
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deferential standards that apply in habeas corpus cases, the
majority discussed the variety of legal contexts in which chil-
dren are treated differently than adults. The Court held that “so
long as the child’s age was known to the officer at the time of
police questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to
a reasonable officer, its inclusion in the custody analysis is con-
sistent with the objective nature of that test.”34 While age may
not be determinative or even significant in every case, “[i]t is 
. . . a reality that courts cannot simply ignore.”35
Dissenting, Justice Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts,
Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas, argued that including age in
the custody analysis would undermine the bright-line nature
of the Miranda rule. Until now, the Miranda custody determi-
nation has been a one-size-fits-all reasonable-person test, but
now it must account for at least one individualized character-
istic. The dissenting justices argued that there was no need to
include this characteristic in the custody inquiry for at least
three reasons. First, because many juveniles questioned by
police are near the age of majority, a one-size-fits-all rule may
not be a bad fit. Second, accounting for the circumstances of
the interrogation (such as questioning at a school, as in this
case) may address many of the same issues without focusing
on an individual characteristic of the suspect. Third, age
always can be considered as part of a voluntariness analysis. In
addition, the dissenters were concerned that the ruling opens
the door to considerations of other personal characteristics.
For example, age may not be different from intelligence, cul-
tural background, education, or other factors and, “[i]n time,
the Court will have to confront these issues.”36 It then will
have to decide whether age is different or “it may choose to
extend today’s holding and, in doing so, further undermine the
very rationale for the Miranda regime.”37
The decision in J.D.B. is quite intriguing for Miranda afi-
cionados. Some may have thought that though it was a habeas
decision, Alvarado foreshadowed a different result. And the
ruling appears counter to the somewhat rote way in which the
justices have tended to assess compliance with Miranda—such
as by permitting flexibility in the language of the warnings,
under the assumption that suspects can understand virtually
any admonitions that cover the legal basics (as in last Term’s
Powell decision), and by accepting an admission as an implied
Miranda waiver, even when that admission comes after several
hours of interrogation (as in Thompkins). In light of the deci-
sions from previous terms, and given the protections that the
Court has afforded to minors in other contexts, it may be dif-
ficult to see J.D.B. as signaling a fundamental shift in the
Court’s approach to Miranda. On the other hand, the dissenters
were surely correct that defendants will argue that other indi-
vidual characteristics of sus-
pects should be treated no
differently than age. It will be
interesting to see how courts
address these and other argu-
ments going forward.38
SIXTH AMENDMENT
The Term produced two
more opinions that mine the
Crawford v. Washington39 and
Davis v. Washington40 mother-
lode.
In Michigan v. Bryant,41 the justices considered whether
admission of a dying declaration violates the Confrontation
Clause. Responding to a radio report, Detroit officers found the
dying victim in a parking lot, shot. They asked him about the
shooting. The victim identified the defendant and provided
some details. The case was tried before Crawford, and the state-
ments were admitted. The Michigan Supreme Court vacated
the conviction, finding a violation of the Confrontation
Clause. In a 6-2 ruling (with Justice Kagan not participating),
the Supreme Court reversed.
Justice Sotomayor wrote for the Court. In Davis, the justices
held that a statement made during police questioning may be
non-testimonial if the circumstances objectively indicated that
the primary purpose of the interrogation was to meet an ongo-
ing emergency. Bryant provided the Court the first opportunity
to apply this test outside of the domestic violence context with
a victim who was found in a public location and a perpetrator
whose location was unknown when the officers found the vic-
tim. A conversation that begins in an effort to determine the
need for emergency assistance, and which is non-testimonial,
may evolve into testimonial statements, the majority noted.
The trial courts can determine when or if that transition
occurs. To assess the primary purpose of the interrogation,
courts may look at the parties’ perception that an emergency is
ongoing and the type of dispute involved. Here the justices
could not say “that a person in [the victim’s] situation would
have had a ‘primary purpose’ ‘to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.’”42 Nothing
in the decedent’s responses indicated to the police that there
was no emergency or the prior emergency had ended.  Further,
the situation in the questioning was informal, more like a har-
ried 911 call than a structured stationhouse interrogation.
Under these circumstances, the decedent’s statements were not
testimonial and their admission did not violate the
Confrontation Clause.43 Justice Thomas concurred in the judg-
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ment because the questioning
by police lacked sufficient for-
mality and solemnity for the
statements to be “testimonial”
in light of historical practices.
Justice Scalia dissented,
using harsh language (even for
him). He wrote that “[t]oday’s
tale” of officers conducting
examinations of a dying man
with the primary purpose to
protect him and others from a
murderer on the loose “is so
transparently false that professing to believe it demeans this
institution.”44 From the victim’s perspective, his statements
had little value except to ensure the arrest and later prosecu-
tion of the defendant. And, according to Justice Scalia, none of
the officers’ actions indicated that they perceived an imminent
threat. Thus, “[t]he Court’s distorted view creates an expansive
exception to the Confrontation Clause for violent crimes.”45
Further, he argued, the majority’s highly contextualized bal-
ancing test is “no better than the nine-factor balancing test we
rejected in Crawford.”46 Justice Ginsburg also dissented,
though she did not join Justice Scalia’s opinion. She under-
scored the concern that the majority has created an expansive
exception to the Confrontation Clause for violent crimes.
The other case, Bullcoming v. New Mexico,47 was a sequel to
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,48 in which the Court found
that a laboratory report identifying a substance as cocaine was
testimonial within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.
Bullcoming involved a forensic laboratory report certifying that
the defendant’s blood-alcohol concentration was above the
level required for an aggravated DWI offense. At trial, the State
did not call the analyst who performed the test and signed the
certification. Rather, prosecutors called a different scientist
from the laboratory. The report was admitted into evidence as
a business record. The New Mexico Supreme Court found that
the report was testimonial but that its admission did not vio-
late the Confrontation Clause. The Supreme Court reversed in
a 5-4 opinion written by Justice Ginsburg.
The Court agreed that the report was testimonial. Unlike
the state supreme court, however, the justices determined that
the analyst who was called at trial was not an adequate substi-
tute for the analyst who conducted the test and wrote the
report. Surrogate testimony could not “expose any lapses or
lies on the certifying analyst’s part.”49 Nor does the
Confrontation Clause itself suggest that open-ended excep-
tions from the confrontation requirement may be developed by
the courts. In a part of her opinion joined only by Justice
Scalia, Justice Ginsburg also wrote that the application of the
Confrontation Clause here would not be an undue burden on
the prosecution, and she rejected a claim that the defense
always could retest the sample if it had any concerns about it.
Justice Sotomayor concurred, largely to highlight some aspects
about how this case fit within the test set forth earlier in the
Term in Bryant.
Justice Kennedy wrote the dissent, which was joined by the
Chief Justice, Justice Breyer, and Justice Alito. They argued
that whether one agrees with the reasoning and result in
Melendez-Diaz, the majority’s decision was a new and serious
misstep. According to the dissenting justices, the certifying
analyst’s role was no greater than that of anyone else in the
chain of custody of the blood sample. They described the mun-
dane task of processing samples and determining blood-alco-
hol content. In their view, “requiring the State to call the tech-
nician who filled out a form and recorded the results of a test
is a hollow formality.”50
EIGHTH AMENDMENT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
The Term’s Eighth Amendment blockbuster was Brown v.
Plata,51 which upheld a remedial order to reduce prison over-
crowding. Because the most significant parts of Plata relate to
the remedy, as opposed to the underlying violation of the
Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,
I discuss the case in the Civil Rights part of this article below.
In addition to Plata, one other Eighth Amendment case, Bobby
v. Mitts,52 is worth noting. In Mitts, the Court granted the
State’s petition for writ of certiorari and summarily reversed
the court of appeals’ grant of sentencing relief to a capital
defendant.
The jury that sentenced Mitts to death had been instructed
to determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the aggravat-
ing circumstances were sufficient to outweigh the mitigating
factors. Further, if the jury made such a finding, it was required
to recommend a sentence of death. But if the jury found that
the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating factors,
the jury then would determine which of two possible life sen-
tences to recommend. The court of appeals found that the
instructions were contrary to Beck v. Alabama,53 which held
that the death penalty may not be imposed when the jury was
not allowed to consider a verdict for a lesser included non-cap-
ital offense and where the evidence may have supported such
a verdict. In its per curiam decision, the Court made clear that
the rule in Beck is limited to instructions at the guilt phase.
“The concern addressed in Beck was ‘the risk of an unwar-
ranted conviction’ created when the jury is forced to choose
between finding the defendant guilty of a capital offense and
declaring him innocent of any wrongdoing.”54 The jurors
already had convicted Mitts on two counts of aggravated mur-
der and two counts of attempted murder. They were instructed
that if they did not find the aggravating circumstances out-
56 Court Review - Volume 47 
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weighed the mitigating factors, they would choose from two
life-sentence options. “There is accordingly no reason to
believe that the jurors in this case, unlike the jurors in Beck,
could have been improperly influenced by a fear that a deci-
sion short of death would have resulted in Mitts walking
free.”55
TENTH AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court does not decide a whole lot of criminal
law cases with Tenth Amendment issues.  Bond v. United
States56 is worth a look-see.
The defendant in Bond was convicted of violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 229, a federal statute that prohibits the possession or use of
a chemical that can cause death, incapacitation, or permanent
harm to humans or animals, where not intended for a “peace-
ful purpose.” Bond contended that Congress had no authority
to enact the statute, arguing that under the Tenth Amendment
the power to criminalize this conduct was reserved to the
States. The court of appeals found that Bonds lacked standing
to raise this claim. The Supreme Court reversed in a unani-
mous opinion authored by Justice Kennedy.
The Court first concluded that Bond had standing for pur-
poses of Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement. She was
challenging her conviction and sentence, her incarceration was
a concrete injury caused by the conviction, and it would be
redressable by invalidating the statute and the conviction. The
Court then decided that her challenge should not be disal-
lowed under the prudential rule that parties generally must
assert their own legal rights and interests, not rest their claims
for relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties. The
justices rejected the argument that Bond merely was seeking to
assert an interest of the State. Rather, she sought to vindicate
her own constitutional interests. “It is true that the federal
structure serves to grant and delimit the prerogatives and
responsibilities of the States and the National Government vis-
a-vis one another.”57 But it does more. “Federalism also pro-
tects the liberty of all persons within a State by ensuring that
laws enacted in excess of delegated governmental power can-
not direct or control their actions.”58 It is appropriate for an
individual to “challenge a law as enacted in contravention of
constitutional principles of federalism. That claim need not
depend on the vicarious assertion of a State’s constitutional
interests,” even if the State’s interests are also implicated.59
Justices Ginsburg and Breyer concurred but observed that a
court could not decline to consider Bond’s constitutional argu-
ment on prudential grounds. The defendant has a personal
right not to be convicted under a constitutionally invalid law.
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT—DUE PROCESS
The Term also produced interesting due process cases
involving civil contempt and parole.
Turner v. Rogers,60 the civil contempt case, raised the ques-
tion of whether an individual imprisoned for civil contempt is
entitled to a lawyer or other pro-
tections. The petitioner, Turner,
repeatedly failed to pay child
support and was held in con-
tempt on five occasions. After
completing a six-month sen-
tence, he received a new order to
show cause why he was not in
contempt because he was still in
arrears. There was a brief hearing
in which Turner was not repre-
sented by counsel.  The clerk told
Turner that he was behind in his
payments, and the judge asked him if he wanted to say any-
thing. After a statement by Turner, the judge found him in con-
tempt and sentenced him to 12 months in detention. While
Turner could purge the contempt by paying all of the amount
owed, the trial court made no findings as to whether Turner
had an ability to pay. Turner appealed, arguing that he was
deprived of his right to counsel under the Due Process Clause.
The Court vacated the finding of contempt, though on differ-
ent grounds than Turner had raised.
Writing for the majority, Justice Breyer explained that
because this was civil rather than criminal contempt, Turner
had no right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment. The
Court also declined to find a right to counsel under the Due
Process Clause in civil-contempt proceedings, even when an
indigent person is ordered confined to custody. Applying the
Mathews v. Eldridge61 balancing test, the justices decided that
although the interest at stake was important, there were other
opposing considerations, and there were substitute procedural
safeguards that could help protect the individual’s interests.
The opposing considerations include that the other party is
often the other parent, who also may be unrepresented by
counsel. Providing an attorney to the non-paying parent
“could create an asymmetry of representation” that would sig-
nificantly alter the proceeding.62 Moreover, a set of substitute
procedural safeguards can significantly reduce the risk of erro-
neous deprivation of liberty. They include providing notice to
the defendant that ability to pay is a critical issue in the pro-
ceeding, using a form or other procedure to elicit financial
information, and providing an opportunity for the defendant
to respond to statements about his financial status. The major-
ity concluded that because Turner received neither counsel nor
the benefit of alternative procedures, his incarceration violated
the Due Process Clause.
Justice Thomas dissented. Joined by Justices Scalia, Alito,
and Chief Justice Roberts, he argued that neither the Sixth
Amendment nor the Due Process Clause provided a right to
counsel. If the Due Process Clause created a right to appointed
counsel in all proceedings in which detention was ordered, the
right under the Sixth Amendment would be superfluous. In a
part of the dissent joined only by Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas
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also contended that there was
no basis for concluding that due
process secured a right to coun-
sel in this circumstance under
an original understanding of the
Constitution. And, he argued,
the majority’s analytical frame-
work did not fully account for
the interests that children and
mothers have in effective and
flexible methods to secure pay-
ment.
In Swarthout v. Cooke,63 two
state prisoners with life sentences in California filed federal
habeas corpus petitions to challenge decisions denying their
release on parole. Under California law, the State’s parole
authority—the Board of Prison Terms—“shall” set a release
date for a life-sentenced inmate “unless” the Board determines
that a lengthier time in custody is required for public safety
reasons. The California Supreme Court has held that when an
inmate seeks judicial review of a parole denial, the standard of
review is whether “some evidence” supports the Board’s deci-
sion. Applying Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and
Correctional Complex64 and Board of Pardons v. Allen,65 the fed-
eral court of appeals found that the statutory “shall/unless”
language creates a liberty interest protected by the Due Process
Clause and that a federal court may examine whether “some
evidence” supports the denial of parole.66 The Supreme Court
disagreed and summarily reversed in a per curiam decision.
The Court held that the “some evidence” rule is not a com-
ponent of the constitutionally protected liberty interest.
Rather, “[w]hen . . . a State creates a liberty interest, the Due
Process Clause requires fair procedures for its vindication—
and federal courts will review the application of those consti-
tutionally required procedures. In the context of parole, we
have held that the procedures required are minimal.”67 In
Greenholtz, the Court previously found that a prisoner seeking
parole “received adequate process when he was allowed an
opportunity to be heard and was provided a statement of the
reasons why parole was denied.”68 No more is required here.
The two inmates were allowed to speak at their hearings and
to contest the evidence against them, they were given access to
records in advance, and they were notified as to the reasons
why parole was denied.69
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW
Most of the Term’s federal criminal law cases are likely to
interest only those involved in federal criminal prosecutions.
But two cases relating to rehabilitation, Pepper v. United States70
and Tapia v. United States,71 may have broader appeal. They
contain fascinating discussions about sentencing traditions
and reveal some sharp disagreements among the justices.
The defendant in Pepper was sentenced several times for a
federal drug offense. The court of appeals determined that the
district court could not take into account post-sentence reha-
bilitation in resentencing an offender. The Supreme Court
reversed in an opinion by Justice Sotomayor.  
The Court began by enunciating the “federal judicial tradi-
tion” that sentencing judges consider defendants as individu-
als. Pointing to Williams v. New York,72 the majority observed
that both before and after the colonies became a nation,
“courts in this country and in England practiced a policy under
which a sentencing judge could exercise a wide discretion in
the sources and types of evidence used” to determine the kind
and extent of punishment.73 Further, “[p]ermitting sentencing
courts to consider the widest possible breadth of information
about a defendant ‘ensures that the punishment will suit not
merely the offense but the individual defendant.’”74 The Court
interpreted a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3661, as consistent
with that tradition and held that a court should not be required
to ignore positive facts about a defendant just because those
facts arose after the initial sentencing. The majority also
rejected a claim that a policy statement issued by the
Sentencing Commission should lead to a different result, espe-
cially “where, as here, the Commission’s views rest on wholly
unconvincing policy rationales not reflected in the sentencing
statutes Congress enacted.”75 Justice Breyer, who had served as
a member of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, concurred but
did not find the majority’s reference to Williams and a sentenc-
ing “tradition” helpful. He pointed out that a primary purpose
of the guidelines was to bring about greater uniformity in sen-
tencing.
Justice Alito dissented, contending that district court judges
are required to give significant weight to the Commission’s pol-
icy determinations. And, he wrote, “[a]nyone familiar with the
history of criminal sentencing in this country cannot fail to see
the irony in the Court’s praise for the sentencing scheme exem-
plified by Williams” and the statute.76 That scheme had fallen
into disrepute by the time Congress sought to revamp federal
sentencing in 1984. Some language in the Court’s opinion
“reads like a paean to that old regime,” and Justice Alito
expressed his fear that the opinion could be interpreted as
approving a move back toward that system.77
The defendant in Tapia was sentenced to 51 months for
alien smuggling. At sentencing, the judge indicated that the
defendant should serve a prison term long enough to allow her
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to qualify for and complete a 500-hour residential drug abuse
program operated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons. The ques-
tion on appeal was whether federal sentencing statutes allow a
sentencing judge to impose or lengthen a prison term in order
to foster the defendant’s rehabilitation. In a unanimous opin-
ion written by Justice Kagan, the Court said no. Tapia—like
Pepper—is a primer on the move from a federal indeterminate
sentencing regime, in which rehabilitated offenders might be
released on parole, to the current system of guidelines and
determinate sentences. Under the federal sentencing statutes,
the Court held, a sentencing court may consider rehabilitation
in determining whether a sanction other than imprisonment is
appropriate, but the statutes leave no room to consider reha-
bilitation in setting the length of a custodial sentence. Justices
Sotomayor and Alito agreed with the Court’s conclusion but
concurred to express their skepticism that the district court
judge in this case actually had lengthened Tapia’s sentence to
promote rehabilitation. But because the record was not entirely
clear, these justices joined in the Court’s order and remanded
the case.
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS
As in many years, the Court had a substantial docket of
habeas corpus cases. But this Term’s decisions seem enor-
mously significant with respect to the deference afforded state
courts under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
(AEDPA). Two opinions, Harrington v. Richter78 and Cullen v.
Pinholster,79 may well become landmarks. For federal habeas
corpus review of state court convictions, this may prove to be
a watershed Term.
Harrington v. Richter contains two important holdings.
Richter was convicted of murder in a California prosecution.
The prosecution argued that the decedent was killed as he lay
on a couch. Richter’s theory was that the shooting was in self-
defense and that the decedent was killed in a crossfire as he
stood in a doorway. There was a pool of blood in the doorway,
but it was never tested to determine its source, and another
person was wounded at the scene of the shooting. After
Richter’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, he filed a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the California Supreme
Court with affidavits from forensic experts to support his the-
ory that the decedent was shot in the doorway and the blood
came from him. The California Supreme Court denied the peti-
tion in a one-sentence summary order. The district court
denied Richter’s federal habeas corpus petition, but the court
of appeals found that he was entitled to relief.  In an 8-0 deci-
sion written by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court reversed.
First, the Court ruled that the state court’s summary denial
was an adjudication that is due deference under AEDPA.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), federal habeas corpus relief
cannot be granted with respect to a claim adjudicated on the
merits in state court unless the
decision was contrary to or
involved an unreasonable
application of clearly estab-
lished federal law or was based
on an unreasonable determina-
tion of the facts. The justices
held that determining whether
a state court’s decision was the
result of an unreasonable legal
or factual conclusion does not
require an opinion from the state court explaining its reason-
ing. Richter also argued that the California Supreme Court
decision did not indicate that it was on the merits. The Court
ruled that when a federal claim has been presented to a state
court and relief is denied, “it may be presumed that the state
court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any
indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary,”80
and Richter did not make a sufficient showing to overcome
that presumption. The state courts or legislature are of course
free to alter state practice or elaborate more fully on the mean-
ing of a summary denial.
Second, the Court held that the California Supreme Court’s
decision was not unreasonable. The justices emphasized that
“[u]nder § 2254(d), a habeas court must determine what argu-
ments or theories supported or, as here, could have supported,
the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is
possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those argu-
ments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior
decision of this Court.”81 While “§ 2254(d) stops short of
imposing a complete bar on federal court relitigation of claims
already rejected in state proceedings,” if the AEDPA standard
“is difficult to meet, that is because it was meant to be.”82
Under the “doubly” deferential standards of Strickland v.
Washington83 and AEDPA, there was a reasonable justification
for the state court’s decision. Justice Ginsburg concurred. She
thought that trial counsel’s performance was unreasonable
under Strickland but that the affidavits did not establish preju-
dice. Justice Kagan took no part in the case.
Another case decided the same day applied Richter to a
claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to move to sup-
press the defendant’s confession before recommending a guilty
plea. In Premo v. Moore,84 another 8-0 ruling, Justice Kennedy
emphasized that the court of appeals “was wrong to accord
scant deference to counsel’s judgment, and doubly wrong to
conclude it would have been unreasonable to find that the
defense attorney qualified as counsel for Sixth Amendment
purposes.”85 The court of appeals erred in finding the state
court’s decision to be contrary to Arizona v. Fulminante,86 since
Fulminante was a case involving the admission of an involun-
tary confession and not the Strickland standard of effective-
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ness. Justice Ginsburg again
concurred, finding an inade-
quate showing of prejudice;
the defendant never said that
had he been better informed,
he would have turned down
the plea offer. Justice Kagan
again took no part in the case.
Cullen v. Pinholster is the
other potential landmark
AEDPA case of the Term with
important implications for
fact-development procedures
and the duties of counsel in a capital case. Pinholster was con-
victed of murder, and prosecutors sought the death penalty.
Before the penalty phase began, defense counsel moved to
exclude aggravating evidence on the grounds that the prosecu-
tion did not provide notice of the evidence it sought to intro-
duce. The motion was denied. The prosecution called a series
of witnesses, and defense counsel called the defendant’s
mother but no mental health experts or other witnesses.
Pinholster was sentenced to death. His conviction was affirmed
by the California Supreme Court, which also summarily
denied (without opinion) two habeas corpus petitions. The
state petitions alleged, among other things, ineffective assis-
tance of counsel based on the failure to conduct a full penalty
phase investigation and failure to present mitigating evidence,
including evidence of mental disorders. Although no hearing
was held in state court on the habeas petitions, the federal dis-
trict court conducted an evidentiary hearing. The district court
granted relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme
Court reversed.
Justice Thomas wrote for the Court. One question was
whether the federal court had properly reviewed the state
court’s determinations of law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
That provision provides that a federal court cannot grant relief
with respect to a claim due to an error of law unless the adju-
dication of the claim “resulted in a decision that was contrary
to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly estab-
lished Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States.”87 In Pinholster, the court of appeals had con-
sidered the evidence adduced during the federal evidentiary
hearing in deciding that the state court had unreasonably
applied Strickland. In a part of the opinion that garnered seven
votes, the Court found that this was error:  “We now hold that
review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record that was
before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the mer-
its.”88 “Although state prisoners may sometimes submit new
evidence in federal court, AEDPA’s statutory scheme is
designed to strongly discourage them from doing so.”89
In another part of the opinion, five justices found that the
court of appeals erred in concluding that the state court had
unreasonably applied clearly established federal law to
Pinholster’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Under
Richter, the petitioner can satisfy the “unreasonable applica-
tion” part of § 2254(d)(1) “only by showing that ‘there was no
reasonable basis’ for the California Supreme Court’s deci-
sion.”90 Pinholster could not meet this demanding standard.
The majority characterized trial counsel’s actions as a strategic
effort to exclude the prosecution’s witnesses for lack of notice
and, if that failed, to put on the defendant’s mother. But more
pointedly, the Court criticized the court of appeals for deriving
from prior Supreme Court decisions such as Williams v.
Taylor,91 Wiggins v. Smith,92 and Rompilla v. Beard,93 a “consti-
tutional duty to investigate,” saying that this overlooked the
wide latitude given to defense counsel in making tactical deci-
sions and that “[b]eyond the general requirement of reason-
ableness, ‘specific guidelines are not appropriate.’”94
Justice Alito concurred in the judgment but disagreed with
the majority’s construction of § 2254(d)(1), finding that a fed-
eral court must take into account the new evidence admitted
in a federal evidentiary hearing. Justice Alito also noted, how-
ever, that under AEDPA such hearings should be rare.
Justice Sotomayor wrote a lengthy and sharp dissent. Along
with Justice Alito, she would have construed § 2254(d)(1) to
permit a federal court to consider new evidence presented at an
evidentiary hearing. The problem with the majority’s approach,
she wrote, “is its potential to bar federal habeas relief for dili-
gent habeas petitioners who cannot present new evidence to a
state court.”95 As an example, she gave the case of a petitioner
who diligently attempted in state court to develop the factual
basis of the claim that prosecutors withheld exculpatory evi-
dence. If the petitioner uncovered evidence after the state
court denied relief but before filing in federal court, there may
be no adequate mechanism for the individual to develop his
claim and obtain a ruling on it, especially if state law does not
permit successive petitions. In a part of the dissent joined by
Justices Ginsburg and Kagan, Justice Sotomayor argued that as
Wiggins, Williams and other cases “make clear, the prevailing
professional norms at the time of Pinholster’s trial required his
attorneys to ‘conduct a thorough investigation of the defen-
dant’s background,’ . . . or ‘to make a reasonable decision that
makes particular investigations unnecessary.’”96 “Wiggins,” she
wrote, “is illustrative of the competence we have required of
counsel in a capital case” and “[t]his case is remarkably simi-
lar to Wiggins.”97
Justice Breyer joined in the majority’s construction of §
2254(d)(1) but would have sent the case back to the court of
appeals to apply the legal standards to the facts. He also wrote
separately to explain the situations in which, in his view, a peti-
tioner might still obtain a federal evidentiary hearing.
In the wake of Pinholster, a number of lower federal courts
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have found that petitioners were not entitled to evidentiary
hearings,98 though some courts have permitted hearings to go
forward in limited circumstances, such as to establish actual
innocence or when a state court made no factual findings but
unreasonably applied Strickland and denied relief based on the
petitioner’s allegations alone.99 It remains to be seen whether
courts will view Pinholster as a substantial revision of defense
counsel’s duties with respect to mitigating evidence.
Two other habeas cases are worth noting. In Walker v.
Martin,100 the Court gave further guidance about state proce-
dural decisions that may bar later federal habeas corpus review.
Martin filed a habeas corpus petition in the California Supreme
Court nearly five years after his conviction became final.
California requires a prisoner to seek habeas relief without
substantial delay.  Many petitions are denied summarily with-
out explanation (as in Richter), but courts also often cite cases
indicating that a petition was dismissed for procedural
grounds. While the California Supreme Court had discretion
to reach the merits of Martin’s petition despite any delay in fil-
ing, that court denied his petition with a citation to two cases,
indicating that the petition was untimely. In a unanimous deci-
sion authored by Justice Ginsburg, the Court found that this
was sufficient to foreclose federal review. A discretionary state
procedural rule “can serve as an adequate ground to bar federal
habeas review” if it is firmly established and regularly fol-
lowed.101 California’s time rule, although discretionary,
instructs habeas petitioners to allege with specificity the
absence of delay, good cause for it, or eligibility for one of sev-
eral exceptions to the time bar. The time rule was thus firmly
established and not too vague; nor did it impose new and
unforeseeable requirements or operate to the particular disad-
vantage of inmates asserting federal rights.
The other case, Wall v. Kholi,102 resolved an issue that had
split the lower federal courts:  whether a motion to reduce a
state sentence tolls the AEDPA limitations period for filing a
federal habeas corpus petition. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2),
a petitioner has one year to file a federal petition, though the
time period is tolled during the pendency of “a properly filed
application for State post-conviction or other collateral
review.”103 The Court in Kholi defined “collateral review” as “a
form of review that is not part of the direct appeal process.”104
Kholi’s motion was filed under a
state rule that functionally pro-
vides for a plea for leniency
apart from the direct review
process and thus was seeking
“collateral review” under this
definition.
CIVIL RIGHTS
The Term’s most significant
civil rights case was Brown v.
Plata, which affirmed a three-
judge panel’s order with respect
to medical care and prison over-
crowding in California. I also will discuss two other civil rights
cases, Skinner v. Switzer105 and Connick v. Thompson;106 they
contain important holdings about the availability of civil rights
remedies for exonerated defendants and those who merely
nurse the hope that they someday may be exonerated.
Two decades-old class-action prison-conditions cases were
consolidated in Plata. One, Coleman v. Brown, involved prison-
ers with serious mental illnesses. The second, Plata, was
brought on behalf of inmates with serious medical conditions.
After years of litigation, which included the appointment of a
special master in Coleman and a receiver in Plata, the plaintiffs
moved to empanel a three-judge court empowered under the
Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)107 to order reductions in
the prison population. Following a trial, the three-judge court
issued a lengthy opinion with detailed findings of fact and
ordered the State to reduce its prison population to 137.5% of
the prisons’ design capacity within two years, though the order
did not require California to achieve this reduction in any par-
ticular manner. The State appealed.  The Supreme Court
affirmed, 5-4.
Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy rejected the claim
that California should have been given more time to imple-
ment other remedial measures before ordering a reduction in
population. The Court noted how long the federal courts
already had sought to remedy the violations. The majority
upheld the factual findings by the three-judge court, its deter-
mination that “overcrowding was the primary cause in the
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sense of being the foremost
cause of the violation,” and the
finding by clear and convincing
evidence that no other relief
will remedy the violation of the
federal right.108 The justices
concluded that the remedial
order was narrowly drawn,
extended no further than neces-
sary to correct the violation of
federal rights, and there were
means of reducing overcrowd-
ing that would have little or no
impact on public safety.  
The four dissenting justices pulled no punches. Justice
Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, alleged that “[t]oday the
Court affirms what is perhaps the most radical injunction
issued by a court in our Nation’s history.”109 That was followed
with perhaps an even more remarkable statement:  “There
comes before us, now and then, a case whose proper outcome
is so clearly indicated by tradition and common sense, that its
decision ought to shape the law, rather than vice versa.”110
These justices disagreed with many aspects of the majority’s
decision, particularly the issuance of a “structural injunction,”
arguing that the decision “vastly expands its use, by holding
that an entire system is unconstitutional because it may pro-
duce constitutional violations.”111 In a separate dissent, Justice
Alito, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, contended that this case
was a perfect example of what the PLRA was supposed to pre-
vent. They took issue with the three-judge court’s factual find-
ings, called the order to release inmates a “radical and danger-
ous step,” and accused the majority of “gambling with the
safety of the people of California.”112
The other two civil rights decisions are important, though
they contain fewer fireworks. Skinner is the “hope to be exon-
erated” case. It presents a question left unresolved two years
ago in District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial District v.
Osborne113 of whether a state prisoner seeking DNA testing of
crime-scene evidence may raise that claim in a civil rights
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Skinner was convicted of sev-
eral counts of murder and sentenced to death in Texas. He
admitted that he was present in the house when the killings
took place but argued that he was too incapacitated to have
committed the murders, and he identified another person as
the likely perpetrator. The State tested some evidence found at
the crime scene, but other evidence (including the murder
weapon) was untested. Texas has enacted a statute to allow
prisoners to gain post-conviction DNA testing in certain cir-
cumstances. Skinner twice moved in state court for the yet
untested biological evidence, but his motions were denied. He
subsequently filed a federal civil rights action seeking access to
the biological evidence. The lower courts dismissed his suit,
finding that an action seeking DNA testing is not cognizable
under § 1983 but instead must be brought as a petition for
writ of habeas corpus. In a 6-3 decision written by Justice
Ginsburg, the Court reversed.
The majority first observed that the question was not
whether Skinner ultimately would win but rather whether his
complaint was cognizable under the federal civil rights statute.
The gist of his legal claim was that the Texas post-conviction
DNA statute, as construed by the Texas courts, denied him due
process because it would appear to foreclose new testing for any
prisoner who could have sought DNA testing before trial but
did not. The Court noted the basic test that a claim should be
raised on habeas corpus if a favorable judgment would neces-
sarily imply the invalidity of the conviction or sentence. In this
case, success in Skinner’s suit for DNA testing “would not ‘nec-
essarily imply’ the invalidity of his conviction. While test
results might prove exculpatory, that outcome is hardly
inevitable; . . . results might prove inconclusive or they might
further incriminate Skinner.”114 As such, the case was properly
filed as a civil rights action. The majority also turned aside
arguments that such a ruling would lead to a proliferation of
federal civil rights actions seeking post-conviction discovery of
evidence.
Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito, dis-
sented. He contended that “[c]hallenges to all state procedures
for reviewing the validity of a conviction should be treated the
same as challenges to state trial procedures, which we have
already recognized may not be brought under § 1983.”115 The
dissenters particularly feared that the decision would spill over
to claims under Brady v. Maryland,116 and they argued that “[i]n
truth, the majority provides a roadmap for any unsuccessful
state habeas petitioner to relitigate his claim under § 1983.”117
If the three dissenting justices in Skinner were especially
concerned about inmates or exonerated defendants raising
Brady claims under § 1983, Connick v. Thompson—decided
just three weeks after Skinner—gave these justices a formida-
ble vehicle to assuage at least some of their fears.
The respondent in Thompson was convicted in Orleans
Parish of two offenses. First, he was convicted of an armed rob-
bery. Then, a few weeks later, he was prosecuted for murder.
Because of the armed-robbery conviction, Thompson did not
testify at the murder trial. He was convicted and sentenced to
death. Years later, just before Thompson was scheduled to be
executed, an investigator made a startling discovery of a crime
lab report that never had been provided to defense counsel. It
turns out that in the robbery case, prosecutors in Orleans Parish
did not disclose that they had a swatch of fabric stained with
the blood of the robber and that the robber had blood type B.
Thompson had blood type O. When this evidence was pre-
sented to the district attorney’s office, it moved to stay the exe-
cution and vacate the armed-robbery conviction. A state court
also reversed the murder conviction (based on the vacatur of
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the armed-robbery conviction). Thompson was retried for the
murder and was acquitted. He then brought a § 1983 action
against the district attorney’s office, District Attorney Connick,
and others alleging that their conduct caused him to be wrong-
fully convicted, incarcerated for 18 years, and nearly executed.
It was conceded at trial that a Brady violation was committed by
one or more of the individual prosecutors involved in the
armed-robbery case. The jury, however, found that the district
attorney and his office were also liable and awarded Thompson
damages. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the
damage award, holding that, on the facts of the case, the district
attorney’s office could not be liable for failure to train prosecu-
tors about their Brady obligations. This time, Justice Thomas’ s
opinion was for the Court.
The majority found that under a failure-to-train theory,
Thompson bore the burden of proving both “(1) that Connick,
the policymaker for the district attorney’s office, was deliber-
ately indifferent to the need to train the prosecutors about their
Brady disclosure obligation with respect to evidence of this
type and (2) that the lack of training actually caused the Brady
violation in this case.”118 Connick prevailed as a matter of law
because Thompson did not prove that the district attorney was
on actual or constructive notice of a need for more or different
Brady training, and thus he was not deliberately indifferent to
such a need. Although Thompson pointed out that during the
10 years before his armed robbery trial, Louisiana courts over-
turned four convictions because of Brady violations by prose-
cutors in Orleans Parish, these could not have put the district
attorney on notice. “None of those cases involved failure to
disclose blood evidence, a crime lab report, or physical or sci-
entific evidence of any kind.”119 Nor could Thompson win by
arguing that the violation in his case was the obvious conse-
quence of failure to provide specific Brady training. “In light of
[the] regime of legal training and professional responsibility,
recurring constitutional violations are not the ‘obvious conse-
quence’ of failing to provide prosecutors with formal in-house
training about how to obey the law.”120 Justices Scalia and
Alito concurred. They emphasized that “failure-to-train” liabil-
ity is available only in limited circumstances and that a pattern
of violations is usually necessary to establish municipal culpa-
bility and causation.
Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justices Breyer,
Sotomayor, and Kagan. They argued that “the evidence demon-
strated that misperception and disregard of Brady’s disclosure
requirements were pervasive in Orleans Parish,” which
amounts to persistent, deliberately indifferent conduct for
which the district attorney’s office bears responsibility under §
1983.121 The dissenting justices pointed to a number of facts:
the prosecutor who suppressed the evidence confessed to a for-
mer Orleans Parish prosecutor that he had done so, and the for-
mer prosecutor kept the confession to himself for five years; the
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prosecution did not disclose 10
other reports or items of evidence
when Thompson was first tried;
and the district attorney himself
and other leaders of the office
misunderstood their obligations
under Brady. Based on the evi-
dence, the dissenters argued, “the
Brady violations in Thompson’s
prosecutions were not singular
and they were not aberrational.
They were just what one would
expect given the attitude toward
Brady pervasive in the District Attorney’s office.”122
A LOOK AHEAD
All in all, 2010-2011 was a significant though perhaps not
momentous Term, apart from the federal habeas corpus rul-
ings. What will the current year bring? It is still early, but a
number of important matters appear headed for decision
including Fourth Amendment challenges to the warrantless
use of GPS tracking devices123 and to suspicionless strip
searches in jails.124 The justices are addressing yet another
Brady violation from the New Orleans District Attorney's
Office.  [insert fn.  Smith v. Cain, No. 10-8145].  As Smith was
argued early in the Term, it is perhaps merely an hors d’oevre
for the Court. Other more substantial cases ask whether allow-
ing an expert witness to testify about the results of DNA test-
ing performed by non-testifying analysts violates the
Confrontation Clause,125 whether the Double Jeopardy Clause
bars reprosecution for a greater offense when a jury dead-
locked on a lesser offense announces that it has voted against
guilt on the greater offense,126 whether a prisoner is always in
custody for Miranda purposes when he is isolated from general
population and questioned,127 and whether failures by state
post-conviction lawyers can be attributed to a capital defen-
dant and thus bar federal habeas review.128 Stay tuned.
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